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1 Introduction
Bangladesh is aiming to achieve the two Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
related to education by 2015, one of which is to ensure the primary education for all
school-aged children (6-10 years). The Government of Bangladesh has taken a few
initiatives which have reportedly increased the net enrollment rates (NER) for the
primary school-age children. For instance, the net enrolment rate of primary school
was about 60% in 1990, which has gradually increased by an additional 20% points
within a decade (BBS and UNICEF, 2000; Chowdhury et al., 2002) and the latest
statistics shows that the NER has reached 88.4% in 2008 (UN, 2011). However, base
line survey conducted by the Department of Primary Education (DPE) of Bangladesh
reveals that the primary education drop out rates in both Government Primary
Schools (GPS) as well as Registered Non-Government Primary Schools (RNGPS)
have increased from 33% in 2002 to 47.2% in 2006 and an alarming 50.5% in 2007
(DPE, 2008, 2009). This means that almost half of the students who enrolled in class 1
will not be able to finish their primary education, indicating a loss of resources which
is termed as a ‘colossal waste’ (pg. 59) by an independent watch dog group of MDGs
in Bangladesh (PFM, 2008).
Literature has identified many potential factors which is crucial in triggering the
process of school dropout in developing countries. These factors could be broadly
classified as individual, household, school and government specific along with natu-
ral disasters driven elements. Individual specific issues that aect dropout aremainly
ill-health, under-nutrition (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1995; ?; Alderman et al., 2001) and
lack ofmotivation (Hunt, 2008). Household levels factors aremainly poverty (Hunter
andMay, 2003), child labor (Sabates et al., 2010), migration (Hunt, 2008) and parental
illiteracy (UNESCO, 1984), attitude and death (Case and Ardington, 2006). A notable
number of papers have reported negative impact of traditional beliefs and religiosity
as well as adolescent marriage and pregnancy on girls education and dropout (Col-
clough et al., 2000; Dunne et al., 2005; Cardoso and Verner, 2006; Bandyopadhyay
and Subrahmanian, 2008; Grant and Hallman, 2008; Hossain, 2010, to name a few).
Other discussed factors are teacher absenteeism (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006), school
location and distance, poor quality educational provision (Harbison and Hanushek,
1992), natural disaster and rehabilitation (DPE, 2009).
One rarely studied cause of dropout is the seasonal labordemand in the agricultural
sector. Poor rural children from agricultural households are often needed by their
families for labor purposes, especially during the peak harvesting seasons. Seasonal
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labor demand is known to lead to high dropout rates in rural areas (Hadley, 2010).
The situationgets even criticalwhen thepeakharvesting season coincideswith school
exam schedules.
Since independence, schooling system in Bangladesh follows the English calender
year as the academic calender without accommodating the agrarian calender. As a
consequence, seasonal agricultural labor demand regularly hampers poor agricul-
tural household children which leads to extended absenteeism from school. This
absenteeism becomes crucial when it aects the final exam preparation, because pro-
gression to the next class is usually given on the basis of satisfactory results of the
annual examination held at the end of each academic year (BANBEIS, 2007).
Unfortunately, the typical exam period in primary and secondary schools usually
coincides with the peak harvesting of wet season paddy called Aman. Aman has
the largest coverage in terms of area and second highest yield in Bangladesh. Aman
is usually harvested during the period of late November to early January, and the
labor demand for the harvesting reaches its peak during December. During the
harvesting season poor households can not aord to hire external labor to help them
with the harvesting procedure. As a result, children from agricultural households
get engaged in harvesting and spend less time in preparing for the final exams,
which might result in failing and eventually dropping out of the schools. Moreover,
children involved in harvesting procedure face frequent injuries which also hamper
their exam preparation.
With publication of a handful of anecdotal papers (Ardt et al., 2005; CAMPE,
2004, 2008; DPE, 2009), importance of seasonal labor impacts on dropout is widely
acknowledged by practitioners. However, academic literature, with an exception of
Sabates et al. (2010), has paid a relatively sparse attention, and such impacts are rarely
examined.*1 This is partly due to diculty in finding valid instrumental variables
to be used in rigorous assessment, because local seasonal labor demand or local
productivity shocks are not readily observable.
The aim of this paper is to rigorously identify the impacts of seasonal labor de-
mand on school enrollment choices. Our assessment takes an advantage of the
overlap between peak seasonal labor demand period and exam period. An ideal
way to conduct such impact evaluation research is to employ a randomized control
trial (RCT). However, implementing a RCT in this context, assigning dierent exam
schedules to dierent individuals, will be dicult and costly, as it must randomize
*1 In a recent comprehensive study to find the reasons for rising dropout in Bangladesh, (DPE, 2009)
reports that after poverty, child labor is the second most frequently cited cause of drop out. Since
poverty and child labor go simultaneously in Bangladesh, academic calender not facilitating the
seasonal labor demand may also has contributed to the rising rate of dropout.
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at school levels which necessitates a large scale operation. Instead of a RCT, this pa-
per utilizes Ramadan holidays as a natural experiment that shifted the exam period
ahead of peak seasonal labor demand period.
Bangladesh is predominantly a muslim country and during the time of Ramadan,
schools are closed for holidays to accommodate Ramadan activities for children.
Since Islamic months follow the lunar calendar, the schedule of Ramadan drifts each
solar year by 11 to 12 days. Interestingly, in the year of 2000, Ramadanwas celebrated
during the month of December, as a result schools had to pre-pone their final exam
schedules in November which did not overlap with the peak seasonal labor demand
period forAman paddy. Three years later, due to shifting Ramadan period, Ramadan
in 2003 was celebrated during November. Schools were closed in November, all the
final exams were scheduled in December which entirely overlapped with the Aman
harvesting season. This makes year 2003 as an ideal candidate for counterfactual
of Ramadan in 2000, and data from both years will provide outcomes of a natural
experiment that reduced the labor demand for children during the exam period. This
paper uses 2000-2003 longitudinal data set to estimate the impact of such overlapping
seasonal labor demand and academic calender on school dropout in Bangladesh.
Consistent with our assumption that children from agricultural households are
more aected than children from non-agricultural households by increased agricul-
tural labor demand in 2003, we find evidence that more children from agricultural
households have dropped out by 2003 than children from non-agricultural house-
holds. Enrollment rates also decrease between 2000 and 2003 as one progresses
through school, but they decrease more for agricultural households. This tendency
remains unchanged after we control for variations at various levels. Our estimates
confirmed our hypothesis that rescheduling exam period o the peak seasonal labor
demand period decreases drop outs (increases enrollment).
In the next section, we will show how we can systematically consider about en-
rollmemt/drop out decisions using a simple dynamic model. In Section 3, we present
identification strategy, discuss potential confounding factors and our ideas on how
we can separate them in the estimation. In Section 4, we use descriptive statistics to
examine data and explain about how we select samples. Section 5 gives estimated
results and Section 6 concludes our analysis.
2 Model
It is a simple task to describe impacts of reduced seasonal labor demand, as a
consequence of Ramadan coincidingwith examperiod in 2000, in a theoreticalmodel.
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Consider an individual living for 2 periods. In the first period, she faces a trade-o
in choosing the optimal hours l in schooling over work 1   l. If she chooses to go to
school for l hours, she receives an income according to production function h(1   l),
and her second period income y increases at rate e(l) > 0 with e(0) = 1. We let a
multiplicative term 11+aD with a > 0 which measures the productivity change to enter
production, where in o-harvest seasons D takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise.
Rewriting 11+aD = m, individual’s problem is:
max
fc1;c2;lg
u(c1) + u(c2)
s.t. mh(1   l) = c1 + s
e(l)y + Rs = c2
(1)
where we denoted ct as period t consumption,  2 (0; 1] as a discount factor, s as
saving, y as second period base income, and R > 0 as an interest rate factor. Upon
substitution, this is equivalent to:
max
fs;lg
u[mh(1   l)   s] + u[e(l)y + Rs]
First order conditions (FOCs) are, assuming positive saving:
 u0(c1) + Ru0(c2) = 0;
 mh0(1   l)u0(c1) + e0(l)yu0(c2) = 0:
The second FOC shows that individuals equate marginal utility loss of income in
the period 1 due to schooling to marginal utility gain due to increased income in the
second period. Substituting the first FOC into the second FOC, we have*2:
e0(l) = Rymh
0(1   l): (2)
If there is a uniform market wage rate w, then at the equilibrium without any factor
market imperfection, we must have w = mh0(1   l). Then the above becomes
e0(l) = Ryw: (3)
Let us assume that the return to schooling e and production h are strictly concave
functions. Assumealso that regularity conditions lim
l!0
e0(l) = 1 and lim
l!0
h0(1 l) = h¯ > 0
*2 We can alternatively rewrite (2) as:
g(l) = Rym; g(l)
def
=
e0(l)
h0(1 l) ; g
0 < 0:
Taking an inverse function will show that l is a nonlinear function in arguments of RHS functions
to which later approximate by log-linearization. In the case of (3), this is equivalent to a wage rate
decrease. Log-linearization of this gives
l '= l + a1(R   R) + a2(y   y) + (m  m);
which gives the basis for the estimation equation.
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hold.*3 Then, we know that there exists l > 0 that satisfy FOCs, because LHS of (2)
is increasing while RHS is decreasing in l. When D = 1 and m < 1, the marginal
productivity of labor gets smaller and l becomes larger.
The impact of having Ramadan during the harvest season is equivalent to a de-
crease in productivity or wage rates in this model. Harvest season coincides with
year-end exam period 2003. In 2000, however, Ramadan holiday was during the
harvest season. This led schools to pre-pone the exams to before the harvest begins.
Hence the individuals faced a lower marginal labor productivity/wage during the
exam period in 2000 than in 2003. This can be expressed as having lower values
for m. If we compare between agricultural and non-agricultural households, we
will be able to identify Ramadan impact on enrollment if mag > mnonag where
m  m2003  m2000.
Noting that passing the exam is critical to the future increase in incomes, individ-
uals’ future incomes crucially depend on the hours spent for the exam before and
during the exam period. As the individuals face lower wage rates, it allowed them
to concentrate their eorts in exam preparation, or to choose a larger l.
3 Identification Strategy
As noted, Ramadan driven school holidays in 2000 forced schools to pre-pone
the exam to November, when Aman harvest has not begun. In Figure 1, schematic
explanation of timing is given. In 2000, exam period and harvest period did not
overlap. In 2003, Ramadan and school holidays preceded the period when exams
and harvest took place concurrently. For students (and their parents) who were
preparing for the exams, this implies that they were facing lower wage rates or
smaller seasonal labor demand during the exam period of 2000 than in 2003. It is
this variation we utilize to identify the impacts of smaller labor demand during the
exam period.
By taking log-linear approximation of (2), the base estimation equation can be
written as:
yi;t = 0xit + ri;tDi + ri;t + vi + ei;t; (4)
where yi;t = 0; 1 is a binary variable indicating enrollment for an individual i at
period t, xi;t is a set of exogenous covariates, ri;1 = 1, ri;2 = 0 is a dummy variable
for Ramadan coinciding with harvest seasons, Di = 0; 1 is a dummy variable for
*3 These assure l > 0 to exist. Given that almost everyone goes to school to some extent, and
Government of Bangladesh introduced compulsory primary education in 1991, these conditions are
not a bad description of reality.
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Figure 1: Ramadan, Exam Period, and Harvest Period in 2000 and 2003
agricultural households, vi is an individual eect, and ei;t is an error term.
In (4) we are approximating l with enrollment continuation binary variable yi;t.
As we do not observe production function h nor wage rate w during exam period,
we take ri;tDi as a proxy of decreased labor productivity or decreased agricultural
wage rates during exam period that agricultural households faced in 2000. The
coecient  of year 2000 dummy ri;t picks up all other eects in 2000 and measures
enrollment dierential in 2000 of agricultural households relative to non-agricultural
households.
xi;t includes all other relevant variables that aect second period base incomes y
and eective interest rate R that an individual faces. These are in general functions
of parental characteristics and wealth levels. So we will incorporate variables such
as head education levels and land holding. These variates may also enter home
production processes h, so the interpretation of estimates on them can be either or all
of future income, eective interest rate, and current production inputs. As it is not
our main focus, we will not try to derive structural interpretation of these estimates.
In general E[xi;tvi] , 0 or E[Divi] , 0, so we demean both sides to eliminate
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individual eects vi:
yi;t   y¯i = 0 (xit   x¯it) + ri;tDi + ri;t + ei;t   e¯i;t;
or,
y˜i;1 = 0x˜i1 + Di +  + e˜i;1;
y˜i;2 = 0x˜i2 + e˜i;2; :
(5)
where we denoted A˜i;t = Ai;t   A¯i.
As we are interested in the impacts of o-harvest exam period, or lowered wage
rates, on enrollment, we need to compare individual’s outcome with credible coun-
terfactual. With the panel data in the absence of any random variations aecting the
magnitude of labor demand that individuals face, the most credible strategy is to
use the dierence-in-dierences (DID) estimator by assuming a group of individuals
faced smaller labor demand than the others. We assume children from agricultural
households faced relatively larger reduction in labor demand in 2000 than children
from non-agricultural households. This is based on a presumption that children of
agricultural households have stronger ties with agricultural community and have
more un-ignorable experiences in agricultural production. From employers’ per-
spectives, children from agricultural households tend to have better expertise in
agricultural production and thus are more employable during the harvesting sea-
son. In addition, we note that non-agricultural households face peak labor demand,
if any, dierent than harvesting season (for example during the time of new year
celebration).
The basic idea of our identification strategy is to use DID and compare enrollment
status between individuals, who are otherwise similar in their observed character-
istics, of agricultural and non-agricultural households, and between 2003 and 2000.
By taking deviations from individual means, we can control for any time-invariant
traits of individuals that may aect school enrollment.
There are a few issues to consider in validatingDID identification strategy. The first
issue is our key identification assumption that individuals from agricultural house-
holds are more strongly aected by the agricultural labor demand than individuals
from non-agricultural households. Even if  is statistically significant, it can be
that agricultural households share unobservable characteristics that result in higher
dropout rates in 2003 than non-agricultural households. However, one must note
that we are controlling for individual fixed-eects. Thus the remaining unobserv-
able characteristics we have to worry about are time-varying ones. The most likely
candidate is plausibility of particularly large agricultural labor demand in 2003. It is
possible that, even if there was no impact of Ramadan 2000 on enrollment, the good
harvest in 2003 induced higher dropout rates for agricultural households relative to
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non-agricultural households, making 2000 enrollment large relative to 2003.
To test this idea, it is ideal to use paddy productivity in the regressor. However,
the data set focuses on schooling and puts sparse attention on production-related
information. As a proxy to paddy productivity variability, we include year 2003
dummy and interaction terms of location (thana*4) dummies and year 2003 dummy,
although these variable captures all other time-variant causes that aect enrollment.
While an imperfectmeasure, we note that national production ofAmandoes not dier
much between these two seasons, 11249 thousand metric tons in 2000 and 11520.5
thousand metric tons in 2003, a 2.4 per cent change.
Second, it is arguable that our identification strategy cannot separately identify
Ramadan impacts from any event peculiar to 2003 that is unrelated to productivity
shocks. An example is having a holiday season before the exam period. This hap-
pened in 2003 but not in 2000. This can harm learning for children whose learning
environment is disadvantageous. So it is possible that it is not Ramadan impact that
our interaction term between agricultural household and year 2003 dummies are
picking up, but the impacts of having holidays before the exams that are specific to
agricultural households. The latter impact may penalize enrollment, because learn-
ing environment in agricultural households are expected to be poorer, even after we
control for observable wealth measures such as land holding, non-land assets, and
ocial poverty status.
To examine if such interpretation holds, we will add parental education variables
to regressors. If home learning environment diers and aects enrollment, it should
also aect how the children spend their holidays before the exam in 2003. So children
frommore learning-conducive home, which is supposedly positively correlatedwith
parental education, should increase the chance of enrollment. Asmaternal education
can play a key role in home learning (Behrman et al., 1999), we include both parents’
education variables in our regressions. In doing so, we had to reduce the sample size
as we needed to exclude single-parent households.
Third involves the subtlties on how ages aect enrollment status. As a general
trend in the low income areas, enrollment rates decrease as one progresses in school.
So we will need to control for baseline dropout rates for each cohort. One way to
achieve this is to use individual deviation from cohort mean. Assuming individuals
in the same cohort faces the same dropout distribution, then taking deviation from
the cohort mean will control for baseline dropout rates for the cohort. So the base
model changes to
yi;c;t = 0xi;c;t + ri;c;tDi;c + vi;c + ei;c;t; (6)
*4 A thana is an administrative unit for subdistricts.
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This gives cohort means by year as:
y¯c;1 = 0x¯c;1 + D¯c + v¯c + e¯c;1;
y¯c;2 = 0x¯c;2 + v¯c + e¯c;2;
Using the original FE model, cohort demeaned estimation equations are:
yi;c;1   y¯c;1 = 0  xi;c;1   x¯c;1 +   Di;c   D¯c + (vi;c   v¯c + ei;c;1   e¯c;1);
yi;c;2   y¯c;2 = 0  xi;c;2   x¯c;2 + (vi;c   v¯c + ei;c;2   e¯c;2):
Individual mean for these is:
y¯i;c   y¯c = 0  x¯i;c   x¯c +  12  Di;c   D¯c + (vi;c   v¯c + e¯i;c   e¯c);
or
y˜i;c = 0x˜i;c +  12 D˜i;c + (v˜i;c + e˜i;c);
wherewedenoted A˜i;c = A¯i;c A¯cwith slight abuse of notation. Demeaning individual
means will give:
yi;c;1   y¯c;1   y˜i;c = 0 xi;c;1   x¯i;c    x¯c;1   x¯c +  12  Di;c   D¯c + (ei;c;1   e¯i;c   (e¯c;1   e¯c));
yi;c;2   y¯c;2   y˜i;c = 0 xi;c;2   x¯i;c    x¯c;2   x¯c +  12   (Di;c   D¯c) + (ei;c;2   e¯i;c   (e¯c;2   e¯c)):
Note:
ri;tDi;c

t
= 12Di;c; ri;1Di;c

ijc = D¯c;
ri;2Di;c

ijc = 0; ri;tDi;c

ijc =
1
2 D¯c;
we have
y¨i;c;t = 0x¨i;c;t + d¨i;c;t + e¨i;c;t;
where we denoted A¨i;c;t = Ai;c;t   A¯i;c   (A¯c;t   A¯c) and di;c;t = ri;tDi;c. Note that we have
got rid of all fixed eects from our estimation equation.
In sum, under the full set of controls, we control for time-invariant individual
characteristics, time-variant aggregate unobservables, time-variant thana-level un-
observables, and cohort eects. We also confirmed that national paddy production
does not show a significant increase in 2003 relative to 2000. If there is anything else
that systematically prompted individuals to drop out only from agricultural house-
holds at individual level in 2003, such as household-level productivity shocks that
are uncorrelated with aggregate productivity shocks and household time-invariant
unobservables, we are not controlling them. This is the extent of credibility that our
analysis conveys.
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4 Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics
Data setweuse is a panel collected in 2000 and 2003 in rural Bangladesh as FFE-CEF
by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). It surveyed 469 households
from 47 villages to investigate the impacts of Food-For-Education (FFE) programs
on school enrollment. From these households, the total of 2597 individuals were
surveyed.
In our analysis, we will compare agricultural households against non-agricultural
households in their enrollment trends. An agricultural household is defined as
a household with at least one member reporting its main income source or main
occupation as agriculture, or a household owning agricultural plots. We also used
a narrower definition if the household head reports his/her main income source or
self-reported occupation is agriculture. Dierent definitions are highly correlated
with each other and estimated results turned out to be similar. So wewill use income
source, self-reported occupation, and ownership of agricultural plots as definition of
agricultural households. Wewill interact the agricultural householddummywith the
year 2003 dummy to see if we observe a positive correlationwith drop out (indicating
smaller drop out rates in 2000 for agricultural households).
In Tables 1, 2, three-year trends in enrollment rates for each age group and cohort
using original panel data are reported, respectively. While per age group dierences
do not show any consistent pattern, per cohort dierences show two things: First,
children are more likely to stop enrollment within three years as they become older.
Second, as shown in Table 2, it is generally the agricultural households who report
larger drops in enrollment rates. The overall reduction in enrollment rates between
2000 and 2003 is 14.28% points for agricultural householdswhile it is 8.18% points for
non-agricultural households. This seemingly small dierence between two groups
of households can be greater than theymay look, becausewe are dealingwith limited
dependent variables whose values are less likely to decrease from lower levels. For
example, a decrease from 68.25% to 30.16% is a 38.09 point or a 55.81% reduction,
while 77.14% to 41.18% is a 35.96 point or 46.62% reduction. These two findings
give some vindication to our supposition that children from agricultural households
may have been aected more strongly by reduced labor demand in 2000. While
this is all suggestive, we need to employ a more elaborate estimation technique than
descriptive statistics to rigorously identify the impacts of Ramadan in 2000.
Given our focus on primary and secondary schooling, we will set age limits on
the sample we use in our empirical analysis. In Bangladesh, school age ocially
10
Table 1: Enrollment Rates per Age
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 all
2000 all 12:70 63:00 80:36 84:82 83:33 92:00 89:58 84:91 71:43 67:09 52:38 60:87 38:10 38:24 0:00 0:00 69:11
(63) (100) (112) (112) (108) (125) (96) (106) (98) (79) (63) (46) (42) (34) (13) (33) (1230)
a 7:69 61:40 75:93 83:82 83:61 91:55 84:75 82:46 68:25 65:91 54:55 54:17 50:00 31:58 0:00 0:00 66:20
(39) (57) (54) (68) (61) (71) (59) (57) (63) (44) (44) (24) (28) (19) (8) (26) (722)
n 20:83 65:12 84:48 86:36 82:98 92:59 97:30 87:76 77:14 68:57 47:37 68:18 14:29 46:67 0:00 0:00 73:23
(24) (43) (58) (44) (47) (54) (37) (49) (35) (35) (19) (22) (14) (15) (5) (7) (508)
2003 all 10:91 46:88 68:35 87:30 84:31 92:79 83:33 75:93 69:77 71:11 55:14 34:02 26:25 25:40 13:04 2:44 59:38
(55) (64) (79) (63) (102) (111) (114) (108) (129) (90) (107) (97) (80) (63) (46) (41) (1349)
a 10:71 41:67 60:00 82:50 80:70 96:23 80:00 75:41 70:67 64:15 47:37 30:16 26:67 20:45 4:17 0:00 55:50
(28) (36) (40) (40) (57) (53) (70) (61) (75) (53) (57) (63) (45) (44) (24) (27) (773)
n 11:11 53:57 76:92 95:65 88:89 89:66 88:64 76:60 68:52 81:08 64:00 41:18 25:71 36:84 22:73 7:14 64:58
(27) (28) (39) (23) (45) (58) (44) (47) (54) (37) (50) (34) (35) (19) (22) (14) (576)
change all 1:79 16:12 12:00  2:48  0:98  0:79 6:25 8:98 1:66  4:02  2:76 26:85 11:85 12:84  13:04  2:44 9:73
a  3:02 19:74 15:93 1:32 2:90  4:68 4:75 7:05  2:41 1:76 7:18 24:01 23:33 11:12  4:17 0:00  10:71
n 9:72 11:54 7:56  9:29  5:91 2:94 8:66 11:16 8:62  12:51  16:63 27:01  11:43 9:82  22:73  7:14  8:65
Source:Compiled from original IFPRI data before dropping observations.
Notes: 1. Numbers in first parenthesis are number of observations of each cell.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
3. Column under “All” indicates simple group means.
4. Rows headed by ‘a’ indicates agricultural households, ‘n’ indicates non-agricultural households.
Table 2: Enrollment Rates per Cohort in 2000
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 all
2000 all 12:70 63:00 80:36 84:82 83:33 92:00 89:58 84:91 71:43 67:09 52:38 60:87 38:10 72:78
a 7:69 61:40 75:93 83:82 83:61 91:55 84:75 82:46 68:25 65:91 54:55 54:17 50:00 70:55
n 20:83 65:12 84:48 86:36 82:98 92:59 97:30 87:76 77:14 68:57 47:37 68:18 14:29 75:88
2003 all 87:30 84:31 92:79 83:33 75:93 69:77 71:11 55:14 34:02 26:25 25:40 13:04 2:44 61:77
a 82:50 80:70 96:23 80:00 75:41 70:67 64:15 47:37 30:16 26:67 20:45 4:17 0:00 57:85
n 95:65 88:89 89:66 88:64 76:60 68:52 81:08 64:00 41:18 25:71 36:84 22:73 7:14 67:22
change all 74:60 21:31 12:43  1:49  7:40  22:23  18:47  29:77  37:41  40:84  26:98  47:83  35:66 11:01
a 74:81 19:30 20:30  3:82  8:20  20:88  20:60  35:09  38:09  39:24  34:10  50:00  50:00  12:71
n 74:82 23:77 5:18 2:28  6:38  24:07  16:22  23:76  35:96  42:86  10:53  45:45  7:15  8:66
Source: Compiled from original IFPRI data before dropping observations.
Notes: 1. Numbers in first parenthesis are number of observations of each cell.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
3. Column under “All” indicates simple group means.
4. Rows headed by ‘a’ indicates agricultural households, ‘n’ indicates non-agricultural households.
starts from six. However, some parents choose to start earlier.*5 Considering the
small chance of working as a harvest laborer, and the fact shown in Table 2 that most
individuals younger than age 10 cohort in 2000 do not drop out by 2003, we will use
only age 11 and older. We have used other cut o ages (10 and 12) and the results are
similar and follows a statistically predicted pattern (See page 5).
Setting the upper-bound age for our sample is not as simple as the lower-bound.
High schools ocially end at the age of sixteen, but due to late start and repetition,
many children stay in high schools at ages older than sixteen. As the public primary
schools accept up to age ten for class 1, and the fact that many children start enrolling
at schools late, there are many children who may be considered as “adults” if judged
only with their age, still going to school nonetheless. Thus we will have many
individuals included in our sample who have already finished schooling if we set a
*5 At the same time, judging from discrepancy of information between two waves of data, there is
a good chance that parents may say “yes” to enrollment without understanding the question was
asking about primary school, not preschool.
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uniform upper-bound for age at twenty three, say.
Fortunately, the data has information on the year of first enrollment. We will use
the expected year of finishing high school as our primary criteria to exclude adults
from our sample. We will allow for a three year margin to factor in class repetition.
So any individual whose expected year of graduation is 2000 or later will be included
in our sample. At the same time, it is unrealistic to assume a twenty eight year old
individual to be in class 10. So we will combine another cuto at age twenty five in
wave 1 (2000). So the upper-bound of age is set by the interaction of two conditions:
an individual with expected year of graduation is no earlier than 2000, and ages
below twenty five in 2000.
Under these conditions, it turns out that the eldest individual in our sample is
twenty one in 2000. There are originally 2597 individuals in the original panel
data, of which 881 individuals fit into age limits (between 7 and 25) and expected
graduation after 2000. We have excluded individuals whose highest education level
in wave 2 (2003) is Play-School, Madrasa, Bachelor or higher degrees, in which we
dropped 24, 1, and 18 individuals, respectively. This leaves us with 838 individuals,
and after imposing lower age limit of 11 years and older, we drop 388 individuals
and total number of individuals in our sample becomes 450.
Drop out in this paper is defined as an individual whowas enrolled in 2000 but not
in 2003. The drop out indicator takes the value of 1 in 2003 if it satisfies the definition
of drop out, 0 otherwise. The drop out indicator takes the value of 0 for all individuals
in 2000. So if we take a cluster deviation from its mean (i.e., taking deviation from
individual mean), an individual who dropped out has the values -.5 and .5 in 2000,
2003, respectively, while non-drop outs have all zero’s.*6 If there is an enrollment
enhancing eect in Ramadan of 2000, then the year dummy for 2003 will be positive
in drop out regressions. If its impact is limited to agricultural households, then the
interaction term between year 2003 and agricultural household dummy variables
should have a positive estimate, but not necessarily on year 2003 dummy per se. In a
sense, enrollment enhancing impacts of Ramadan 2000, if any, increase the drop out
probability, because one needs to be enrolled in the earlier years to be dropped out in
the later years. Enrollment indicator is a mirror image of drop out indicator, taking
the value of 1 if enrolled to school, 0 otherwise.
The data set reports reasons for stop going to school, which are given in Table
3. As the data also have household consumption information, we summarized the
reported reasons for dropping out by per household member consumption quartiles
*6 So the drop out indicator assumes the exactly the same values as the enrollment dummy when we
take within-cluster deviations, except that the signs are opposite.
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Table 3: Reported Reasons for Stop Going to School by Consumption Quartiles
quartile group financial not accepted school environnot want to, others distance sickness marriage NA total
1 non-goers 2000 0:68 0:02 0:27 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 41
1 non-goers 2003 0:55 0:00 0:01 0:10 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:33 114
1 drop outs 2003 0:60 0:00 0:01 0:09 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:28 75
2 non-goers 2000 0:57 0:00 0:23 0:09 0:09 0:00 0:00 0:03 35
2 non-goers 2003 0:36 0:00 0:04 0:19 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:41 81
2 drop outs 2003 0:44 0:00 0:04 0:12 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:38 50
3 non-goers 2000 0:57 0:00 0:26 0:04 0:00 0:09 0:00 0:04 23
3 non-goers 2003 0:28 0:00 0:00 0:24 0:00 0:01 0:04 0:42 78
3 drop outs 2003 0:25 0:00 0:00 0:26 0:00 0:02 0:04 0:44 57
4 non-goers 2000 0:22 0:11 0:44 0:00 0:11 0:00 0:00 0:11 9
4 non-goers 2003 0:10 0:03 0:03 0:20 0:00 0:03 0:02 0:58 60
4 drop outs 2003 0:12 0:04 0:02 0:19 0:00 0:04 0:02 0:58 52
ag HH group financial not accepted school environnot want to, others distance sickness marriage NA total
yes non-goers 2000 0:60 0:02 0:24 0:06 0:06 0:00 0:00 0:02 63
yes non-goers 2003 0:33 0:00 0:02 0:17 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:44 204
yes drop outs 2003 0:31 0:01 0:02 0:19 0:01 0:01 0:03 0:43 145
no non-goers 2000 0:62 0:02 0:33 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 42
no non-goers 2003 0:42 0:01 0:01 0:19 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:36 123
no drop outs 2003 0:49 0:01 0:01 0:13 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:35 86
Source:Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Numbers are all ratios except totals.
2. “ag HH” indicates agricultural households. See main text for definition of agricultural households.
3. Non-goers are individuals who were not enrolled in respective period.
4. Drop outs are individuals who were enrolled in 2000 but not in 2003.
Table 4: Tabulation of Agricultural vs. Consumption Quartiles (%)
ag HH/quartile 1 2 3 4 NA rowtotal (persons)
yes 23:68 23:4 20:06 32:87 0 718
no 25:47 24:84 30:27 18:37 1:04 958
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Consumption quartiles are based on households, not individuals.
2. “ag HH” indicates agricultural households. See main text for definition of
agricultural households.
in the top table. We have summarized the reported reasons by agricultural or non-
agricultural households in the bottom table. In the top table, drop out rates are higher
for lower per member consumption quartiles, and their reasons for dropping out are
more concentrated in financial diculty while upper quartile individuals give non
financial reasons such as not fitting well or marriage. This suggests that we need to
control for household wealth in analyzing school enrollment decisions.
In the bottom table of Table 3, there is no significant dierence in terms of reported
reasons by agricultural and non-agricultural households. This is because each row
conditions on not enrolled to schools, and the proportions of two bottom and top
quartiles, which report similar reasons within each group, do not dier much for
agricultural and non-agricultural households, as seen in Table 4 where we tabulated
agricultural/non-agricultural households against consumption quartiles.
In analyzing enrollment behavior, one needs to take education support programs
into account. It turns out that most of drop outs do not have membership to any of
the listed support programs.
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5 Estimation Results
In Table 5, estimated results on drop out are shown. First column (1) is the most
basic specification where we control for individual characteristics, participation to
various education support programs including cash transfer programs, year eect,
and land and non-land assets. The covariates used for individual characteristics
are age and sex. As we estimate fixed-eect models, sex is interacted with year
2003 dummy. Other household characteristics, agricultural household dummy, per
member land holding, and non-land asset values, are also interacted with year 2003
dummy. We have also used other covariates suggested by the theoretical model,
such as poverty status, household head’s educational attainment, GPS-measured
distance to schools, anthropometric measures, but none of them turned out to be
statistically significant and have been dropped from estimation for Table 5 (See Tables
11, 12). Column (2) uses children other than sons and daughters of household head
(“extended household” specification). In columns (3) and (4), we subtracted cohort
means, while using nuclear household and extended household data, respectively.
Columns (5) to (8) use the same sample and demeaning as in columns (1) to (4),
except the regressors include gender of children. In columns (9) and (10), we also
use thana*2003 interaction terms to control for thana-level productivity shocks.
From Table 5, we see that estimates on agricultural household dummy has positive
impacts on drop out probability. Point estimates range from 10% points to 12%
points, and all estimates are statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 6 shows the results for enrollment. As enrollment is conceptually a mirror
image of drop outs, we see that the results to be similar except that signs are op-
posite. As in the drop outs, program membership to education support programs
have large impacts on enrollment. Estimates show that girls have lower enrollment
prospects in rural Bangladesh, because, firstly, back in 2000 and 2003, employment
opportunities which require higher education were limited, and secondly, parents
may find it financially unrewarding to invest on girls as they will marry o and will
not provide as much old age supports as boys. Per member land holding shows pos-
itive estimates, indicating that any deterring impacts of family labor demand, due
to imperfect substitutability between family and hired labor, if any, are overturned
by wealth eects on enrollment. Estimates on non-land assets are positive, also in-
dicating wealth eects. Agricultural household dummies are all negative, indicating
that enrollment probabilities of children from agricultural households dipped more
severely in 2003 than children from non-agricultural households.
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Table 5: Linear Dropout Probability Fixed-EffectModel
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:075  0:082  0:125  0:132
(0:085) (0:084) (0:077) (0:076)
age2 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:009
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
year 2003  0:495  0:491  0:562  0:557
(0:219) (0:219) (0:188) (0:187)
program membership  0:603  0:603  0:592  0:594  0:647  0:648  0:637  0:638  0:643  0:644
(0:032) (0:031) (0:034) (0:034) (0:031) (0:030) (0:034) (0:033) (0:034) (0:033)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household 0:120 0:110 0:118 0:107 0:130 0:120 0:123 0:114 0:102 0:105
(0:038) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037) (0:036) (0:036) (0:037) (0:036) (0:039) (0:038)
sex (female = 1) 0:181 0:181 0:179 0:177 0:184 0:181
(0:037) (0:036) (0:037) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037)
per member land holding  4:940  4:426  3:466  2:864  6:947  6:556  5:537  5:041  6:211  6:298
(1:402) (1:398) (2:078) (1:852) (1:534) (1:474) (2:137) (1:975) (2:720) (2:298)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk)  5:696  5:428  5:802  5:534  5:115  4:886  5:151  4:893  5:020  4:895
(1:974) (1:981) (2:031) (2:030) (1:896) (1:898) (1:939) (1:937) (1:894) (1:906)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 417 446 410 438 417 446 410 438 410 438
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
Table 6: Linear Enrollment Probability Fixed-EffectModel
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age 0:005 0:012 0:053 0:060
(0:102) (0:101) (0:102) (0:101)
age2  0:008  0:008  0:009  0:009
(0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
year 2003 0:743 0:738 0:807 0:802
(0:287) (0:284) (0:282) (0:279)
program membership 0:614 0:614 0:607 0:609 0:656 0:657 0:650 0:651 0:657 0:658
(0:033) (0:031) (0:035) (0:034) (0:032) (0:031) (0:035) (0:034) (0:034) (0:034)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household  0:112  0:102  0:107  0:097  0:121  0:112  0:112  0:104  0:093  0:097
(0:038) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037) (0:037) (0:036) (0:037) (0:036) (0:039) (0:038)
sex (female = 1)  0:174  0:174  0:172  0:170  0:176  0:173
(0:037) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037)
per member land holding 4:670 4:168 3:186 2:606 6:595 6:215 5:173 4:696 5:816 5:939
(1:399) (1:401) (2:050) (1:838) (1:527) (1:475) (2:110) (1:959) (2:616) (2:242)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk) 6:070 5:798 6:185 5:932 5:513 5:277 5:560 5:316 5:490 5:369
(2:012) (2:014) (2:068) (2:059) (1:950) (1:946) (1:990) (1:979) (1:930) (1:935)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 417 446 410 438 417 446 410 438 410 438
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 7 and Table 8 give estimates using an alternative definition for agricultural
households, where we restrict only heads’ self-reports to be eligible in definition.
Estimated results do not change much, both qualitatively and quantitatively, except
that estimate of  become smaller in absolute values, as both definitions are highly
correlated.
As discussed in the section 3, there are two lingering issues in identification. First,
we may be picking up impacts of time-varying productivity shocks that may have
increased labor demand in 2003. Although the aggregate production of Aman is not
very dierent between two waves of data, it is possible that regional variation may
still exist. To best control the productivity dierences, we used year 2003 dummy
for aggregate productivity shocks, and thana*2003 interaction terms for time-variant
thana-level productivity shocks. This is shown in specification (8) and (9) in both
Tables 5, 6, and all point estimates attenuate by about 1% point, but stay statistically
significant.
Second, our identification strategy cannot separately estimate seasonal labor de-
mand impacts from any event peculiar to 2003 that is unrelated to productivity
shocks, such as having holidays prior to exam period. To control for possible dif-
ferences in home learning environment, we added to regressors parental education
variables. Tables 9, 10 show the estimated results. Surprisingly, paternal secondary
education reduces enrollment. This may be because more educated fathers, after
controlling for household wealth, may have stronger ties with potential employers,
or own more agricultural machinery which increases per area marginal labor pro-
ductivity. Maternal secondary education has positive impacts on enrollment, but
does not aect point estimates of . Most estimates of  stay statistically significant
and show the expected signs.
As a part of further robustness check, we include other possible covariates, such
as height and weight of children from respective age means, ocial poverty status,
and GPS-measured distance to schools. Tables 11, 12 show the estimated results. As
there are many missing observations in anthropometric information, sample size is
more than halved that may aect statistical power. It turns out that most of esti-
mates are statistically insignificant, although, probably due to much smaller sample
size, estimates of  also become statistically insignificant in most specifications. An-
thropometric measures have expected signs, taller heights and heavier weights will
induce more drop outs, suggesting that brawl can be a deterrent to schooling in 2003.
If we use a lower age cut o, it will leave more younger children in the sample.
Then it is reasonable to expect a smaller proportion of individuals to be distracted
with their schooling by harvest labor, leading to attenuated estimates of . Increased
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sample size may improve standard errors, so the changes in significance levels can
go either way. This is indeed the case in Tables 13, 14 where we show estimated
results using a new age cut o at ten or older. All point estimates become smaller,
but estimates remain statistically significant, because standard errors are smaller. In
contrast, if we set the cut o at twelve and older, the contrary should occur. This is
what we observe in Tables 15, 16. We have greater point estimates but also greater
standard errors. As net results, Tables 15, 16 show estimates become statistically
significant at smaller p-values, which provides another indication of robustness.
6 Conclusion
The issue of seasonality is quite important and needs to be addressed properly
to have eective public policies. Adjustments in institutional design are necessary
for developing countries which are predominantly agrarian economies and are fre-
quently aected by seasonality. To our surprise, seasonally adjusted policies outside
the context of food security and disaster management are rare. This paper seeks to
address the impact of seasonal labor demand on school enrollment and drop out in
Bangladesh. The school calender for both primary and high schools in Bangladesh
is not seasonally adjusted to local agriculture. This can increase drop out by forcing
children to trade-o between education and work, especially during the peak har-
vesting season. To identify the impacts of seasonal labor demand on dropout, we
employed Ramadan vacation in the year of 2000 as a natural experiment. In 2000,
Ramadan driven school vacation coincided with the original annual exam period of
December. This forced schools to pre-pone their final exam schedules in November,
which was the month before the harvest begins. As a consequence, labor demand
during the annual examination period in year 2000was smaller. Comparing this phe-
nomenon with year 2003, by employing longitudinal data, we found positive and
significant impacts of seasonal labor demand on drop out for the rural agricultural
households in Bangladesh.
There are arguably ample factors other than seasonality that are limiting educa-
tional attainment and increasing the dropout in Bangladesh. However, adjusting the
school calendars with local agrarian calendars will at least reduce the dilemma faced
by the children from the agricultural households and implementing such adjustment
is almost costless for Bangladesh. Countries like Japan, Brazil, Colombia and The
Gambia have implemented seasonally adjusted education policies in the past, and
their impacts are told favorably, if anecdotally. Even in Bangladesh, non-formal ed-
ucation providers, which are mainly Non Government Organizations (NGOs), have
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also taken steps to adjust school calendars with seasonality. For instance, schools run
by BRAC, a leading NGO for example, has already undertook seasonally-adjusted
school calendar in Bangladesh.
We have used household level panel data to rigorously assess the impacts of having
the exams in o-harvesting seasons. Our identification strategy usingDID estimators
relied on several assumptions: First, dierential impacts exist between agricultural
and non-agricultural households. This is likely to hold, as non-agricultural house-
holds face peak labor demand, if any, dierent than harvesting season (for example
during the time of new year celebration). Second, from employers’ perspectives,
children from agricultural households tend to have better expertise in agricultural
production and thus are more employable during the harvesting season. Third, im-
pacts of having holidays immediately before the exam period can be partly captured
by parental education that are assumed to proxy the home learning environment.
While these proxies are never perfect, they will control certain aspects of learning
environment at the home. Given these considerations, we expect the results of our
empirical analysis to have high credibility.
Wehave shown that estimated results robustlypoint that schooling of children from
agricultural households have benefitted from Ramadan holidays in 2000 relative to
children from non-agricultural households. Results survived after extensive specifi-
cation search, where we used various wealth, anthropometric, locational measures,
ocial program membership, ocial poverty status, and we have also controlled
for cohort eects. The results shown in this paper can provide foundation for re-
considering the school calendar that is consistent with seasonal local labor market
conditions.
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Table 7: Linear Dropout Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Alternative AgriculturalHousehold Definition
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:081  0:087  0:130  0:136
(0:085) (0:084) (0:077) (0:076)
age2 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:009
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
year 2003  0:488  0:482  0:551  0:544
(0:219) (0:218) (0:188) (0:186)
program membership  0:597  0:598  0:588  0:590  0:640  0:641  0:632  0:633  0:638  0:639
(0:032) (0:031) (0:034) (0:034) (0:031) (0:030) (0:034) (0:033) (0:034) (0:033)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household 0:117 0:102 0:113 0:097 0:121 0:108 0:114 0:100 0:091 0:089
(0:037) (0:036) (0:037) (0:036) (0:035) (0:035) (0:036) (0:035) (0:037) (0:036)
sex (female = 1) 0:177 0:177 0:176 0:175 0:182 0:178
(0:037) (0:036) (0:037) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037)
per member land holding  5:101  4:519  3:720  3:057  7:007  6:553  5:711  5:168  6:439  6:522
(1:399) (1:412) (2:026) (1:841) (1:510) (1:464) (2:076) (1:953) (2:713) (2:329)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk)  5:784  5:486  5:847  5:548  5:205  4:946  5:191  4:906  5:009  4:853
(1:970) (1:980) (2:025) (2:026) (1:896) (1:898) (1:936) (1:936) (1:894) (1:908)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 417 446 410 438 417 446 410 438 410 438
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
Table 8: Linear Enrollment Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Alternative Agricultural Household
Definition
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age 0:011 0:016 0:058 0:063
(0:102) (0:100) (0:102) (0:100)
age2  0:008  0:009  0:009  0:009
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
year 2003 0:735 0:730 0:795 0:790
(0:287) (0:283) (0:281) (0:277)
program membership 0:608 0:610 0:603 0:606 0:650 0:651 0:645 0:647 0:653 0:654
(0:033) (0:031) (0:035) (0:035) (0:032) (0:031) (0:035) (0:034) (0:035) (0:034)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household  0:108  0:094  0:101  0:086  0:112  0:099  0:102  0:089  0:081  0:080
(0:037) (0:036) (0:037) (0:036) (0:036) (0:035) (0:036) (0:035) (0:038) (0:037)
sex (female = 1)  0:170  0:170  0:169  0:168  0:174  0:171
(0:038) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037) (0:038) (0:037)
per member land holding 4:809 4:239 3:402 2:760 6:638 6:195 5:314 4:788 6:001 6:117
(1:400) (1:418) (2:006) (1:831) (1:509) (1:469) (2:058) (1:942) (2:616) (2:277)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk) 6:150 5:848 6:221 5:938 5:594 5:328 5:592 5:321 5:470 5:321
(2:010) (2:013) (2:063) (2:055) (1:950) (1:946) (1:987) (1:977) (1:930) (1:936)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 417 446 410 438 417 446 410 438 410 438
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 9: Linear Dropout Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Parental Education
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:081  0:084  0:134  0:135
(0:088) (0:088) (0:078) (0:077)
age2 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:008
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
year 2003  0:470  0:480  0:450  0:468
(0:231) (0:232) (0:232) (0:234)
program membership  0:617  0:617  0:609  0:610  0:669  0:672  0:662  0:667  0:669  0:673
(0:035) (0:033) (0:037) (0:036) (0:034) (0:032) (0:036) (0:036) (0:035) (0:035)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household 0:128 0:111 0:126 0:109 0:134 0:120 0:126 0:112 0:110 0:113
(0:042) (0:041) (0:042) (0:041) (0:040) (0:039) (0:040) (0:039) (0:043) (0:042)
sex (female = 1) 0:186 0:194 0:188 0:195 0:194 0:200
(0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:040)
spouse sex (female = 1)  0:084  0:083  0:096  0:103  0:187  0:177
(0:130) (0:134) (0:137) (0:142) (0:149) (0:151)
head primary 0:045 0:036 0:043 0:034 0:027 0:019 0:026 0:019 0:025 0:015
(0:043) (0:043) (0:044) (0:044) (0:043) (0:042) (0:044) (0:043) (0:043) (0:043)
head secondary 0:105 0:117 0:099 0:111 0:095 0:114 0:093 0:110 0:104 0:128
(0:053) (0:051) (0:054) (0:052) (0:051) (0:050) (0:052) (0:051) (0:053) (0:051)
head spouse primary 0:007 0:013 0:005 0:012 0:027 0:027 0:023 0:026 0:028 0:025
(0:045) (0:045) (0:046) (0:045) (0:045) (0:044) (0:045) (0:044) (0:044) (0:043)
head spouse secondary  0:019  0:007  0:017  0:004  0:017  0:011  0:016  0:008  0:011  0:012
(0:047) (0:046) (0:049) (0:047) (0:046) (0:044) (0:047) (0:045) (0:046) (0:045)
spouse sex (female = 1)  0:084  0:083  0:096  0:103  0:187  0:177
(0:130) (0:134) (0:137) (0:142) (0:149) (0:151)
per member land holding  5:111  4:366  3:792  2:812  7:196  6:553  5:867  4:983  6:624  6:192
(1:654) (1:697) (2:208) (1:982) (1:780) (1:755) (2:314) (2:113) (2:875) (2:423)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk)  5:874  5:811  6:159  6:037  5:445  5:380  5:622  5:486  5:631  5:682
(2:025) (2:012) (2:084) (2:060) (1:949) (1:930) (1:984) (1:955) (1:914) (1:898)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 722 768 710 756 722 768 710 756 710 756
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 10: Linear Enrollment Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Parental Education
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:006  0:003 0:045 0:045
(0:109) (0:107) (0:111) (0:110)
age2  0:008  0:008  0:009  0:009
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
year 2003 0:785 0:795 0:747 0:764
(0:319) (0:313) (0:340) (0:338)
program membership 0:631 0:630 0:626 0:627 0:680 0:683 0:677 0:682 0:686 0:689
(0:036) (0:034) (0:038) (0:037) (0:035) (0:033) (0:038) (0:037) (0:037) (0:036)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household  0:121  0:105  0:118  0:103  0:127  0:114  0:118  0:105  0:106  0:109
(0:042) (0:041) (0:042) (0:041) (0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:039) (0:044) (0:042)
sex (female = 1)  0:176  0:184  0:178  0:186  0:185  0:191
(0:042) (0:040) (0:042) (0:040) (0:041) (0:040)
spouse sex (female = 1) 0:099 0:097 0:123 0:129 0:223 0:212
(0:130) (0:134) (0:139) (0:144) (0:151) (0:152)
head primary  0:055  0:045  0:053  0:045  0:038  0:030  0:037  0:030  0:036  0:026
(0:043) (0:043) (0:045) (0:044) (0:043) (0:043) (0:044) (0:043) (0:044) (0:043)
head secondary  0:121  0:132  0:111  0:123  0:112  0:130  0:105  0:123  0:118  0:142
(0:054) (0:051) (0:055) (0:052) (0:052) (0:050) (0:053) (0:051) (0:054) (0:052)
head spouse primary  0:005  0:010  0:001  0:008  0:024  0:024  0:020  0:022  0:024  0:020
(0:046) (0:045) (0:046) (0:045) (0:046) (0:045) (0:046) (0:044) (0:045) (0:044)
head spouse secondary 0:013 0:001 0:009  0:002 0:011 0:004 0:008 0:000 0:005 0:007
(0:048) (0:047) (0:049) (0:048) (0:046) (0:045) (0:047) (0:046) (0:046) (0:045)
spouse sex (female = 1) 0:099 0:097 0:123 0:129 0:223 0:212
(0:130) (0:134) (0:139) (0:144) (0:151) (0:152)
per member land holding 4:758 4:020 3:460 2:494 6:729 6:100 5:419 4:550 6:127 5:731
(1:654) (1:714) (2:161) (1:962) (1:772) (1:760) (2:259) (2:083) (2:734) (2:367)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk) 6:112 6:044 6:339 6:224 5:709 5:637 5:837 5:707 5:964 6:003
(2:062) (2:046) (2:134) (2:104) (2:004) (1:981) (2:048) (2:013) (1:977) (1:955)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 722 768 710 756 722 768 710 756 710 756
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 11: Linear Dropout Probability Fixed-EffectModel, All Covariates
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:064  0:084 0:087 0:070
(0:144) (0:149) (0:089) (0:085)
age2 0:002 0:003 0:002 0:002
(0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003)
year 2003  0:362  0:404  0:716  0:764
(0:390) (0:408) (0:181) (0:169)
program membership  0:725  0:733  0:691  0:690  0:700  0:708  0:667  0:667  0:680  0:683
(0:056) (0:053) (0:053) (0:051) (0:057) (0:055) (0:055) (0:054) (0:055) (0:052)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household 0:094 0:087 0:086 0:071 0:110 0:102 0:100 0:081 0:069 0:063
(0:054) (0:052) (0:055) (0:054) (0:058) (0:055) (0:060) (0:057) (0:066) (0:064)
sex (female = 1) 0:317 0:395 0:197 0:227 0:356 0:430 0:203 0:233 0:314 0:359
(0:111) (0:106) (0:060) (0:058) (0:110) (0:104) (0:062) (0:060) (0:079) (0:076)
spouse sex (female = 1) 0:009 0:020 0:032 0:045 0:029 0:039 0:029 0:040  0:060  0:048
(0:074) (0:064) (0:066) (0:058) (0:083) (0:073) (0:075) (0:067) (0:096) (0:092)
height deviation 0:007 0:005 0:006 0:004 0:010 0:008 0:008 0:006 0:006 0:004
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:006) (0:005)
weight deviation 0:002 0:001 0:003 0:003  0:002  0:002 0:001 0:002 0:001 0:001
(0:005) (0:005) (0:006) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006)
head primary 0:023 0:013 0:003  0:007 0:012 0:001  0:007  0:017 0:010  0:007
(0:060) (0:058) (0:061) (0:059) (0:060) (0:058) (0:062) (0:060) (0:062) (0:061)
head secondary 0:112 0:089 0:090 0:062 0:092 0:070 0:067 0:037 0:118 0:079
(0:062) (0:062) (0:067) (0:066) (0:063) (0:062) (0:068) (0:066) (0:072) (0:070)
head spouse primary  0:024  0:019  0:002 0:010  0:018  0:008 0:010 0:025  0:027  0:018
(0:061) (0:059) (0:061) (0:060) (0:063) (0:061) (0:062) (0:060) (0:062) (0:059)
head spouse secondary  0:073  0:059  0:064  0:046  0:079  0:060  0:065  0:042  0:078  0:067
(0:060) (0:058) (0:061) (0:059) (0:060) (0:058) (0:061) (0:059) (0:058) (0:057)
spouse sex (female = 1) 0:009 0:020 0:032 0:045 0:029 0:039 0:029 0:040  0:060  0:048
(0:074) (0:064) (0:066) (0:058) (0:083) (0:073) (0:075) (0:067) (0:096) (0:092)
per member land holding  3:467  3:491  3:462  3:797  4:513  5:780
(2:109) (2:097) (2:074) (2:084) (2:850) (2:762)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk)  7:849  7:655  7:463  6:717  7:937  7:531
(4:135) (3:876) (4:208) (3:745) (4:347) (3:971)
poverty (=1 if BPL)  0:014  0:002 0:006 0:026  0:013 0:023
(0:069) (0:068) (0:071) (0:069) (0:077) (0:076)
GPS distance  0:084  0:092  0:084  0:090  0:108  0:107
(0:071) (0:070) (0:072) (0:070) (0:088) (0:088)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 356 376 354 374 348 368 348 368 348 368
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 12: Linear Enrollment Probability Fixed-EffectModel, All Covariates
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:050  0:030  0:243  0:225
(0:181) (0:185) (0:168) (0:168)
age2  0:003  0:003  0:002  0:003
(0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003)
year 2003 0:743 0:787 1:204 1:253
(0:531) (0:547) (0:475) (0:481)
program membership 0:741 0:749 0:720 0:718 0:714 0:721 0:694 0:694 0:706 0:706
(0:057) (0:055) (0:056) (0:054) (0:058) (0:057) (0:058) (0:057) (0:055) (0:052)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household  0:082  0:075  0:072  0:057  0:108  0:099  0:095  0:075  0:065  0:058
(0:055) (0:053) (0:057) (0:055) (0:059) (0:056) (0:061) (0:058) (0:067) (0:064)
sex (female = 1)  0:287  0:368  0:188  0:219  0:332  0:410  0:190  0:221  0:314  0:359
(0:115) (0:109) (0:062) (0:059) (0:112) (0:106) (0:064) (0:062) (0:079) (0:076)
spouse sex (female = 1) 0:020 0:009 0:011  0:003  0:009  0:020 0:006  0:007 0:110 0:096
(0:072) (0:063) (0:070) (0:065) (0:082) (0:073) (0:078) (0:073) (0:097) (0:093)
height deviation  0:007  0:005  0:006  0:004  0:011  0:009  0:009  0:006  0:006  0:004
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:006) (0:005)
weight deviation  0:002  0:002  0:005  0:004 0:002 0:002  0:003  0:003  0:005  0:005
(0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:005) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006)
head primary  0:044  0:033  0:028  0:017  0:036  0:023  0:018  0:007  0:018  0:001
(0:061) (0:059) (0:062) (0:061) (0:062) (0:060) (0:063) (0:061) (0:062) (0:061)
head secondary  0:141  0:117  0:122  0:094  0:129  0:105  0:106  0:075  0:141  0:102
(0:065) (0:064) (0:071) (0:069) (0:067) (0:065) (0:073) (0:070) (0:073) (0:071)
head spouse primary 0:024 0:018 0:008  0:004 0:023 0:012  0:002  0:017 0:024 0:016
(0:064) (0:062) (0:064) (0:063) (0:064) (0:062) (0:063) (0:061) (0:063) (0:060)
head spouse secondary 0:061 0:047 0:053 0:035 0:073 0:054 0:057 0:034 0:076 0:066
(0:061) (0:059) (0:063) (0:060) (0:060) (0:058) (0:062) (0:060) (0:058) (0:057)
spouse sex (female = 1) 0:020 0:009 0:011  0:003  0:009  0:020 0:006  0:007 0:110 0:096
(0:072) (0:063) (0:070) (0:065) (0:082) (0:073) (0:078) (0:073) (0:097) (0:093)
per member land holding 3:358 3:368 3:387 3:725 4:479 5:777
(2:136) (2:120) (2:075) (2:078) (2:853) (2:772)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk) 8:803 8:528 8:151 7:363 9:376 8:902
(4:819) (4:509) (4:895) (4:356) (4:819) (4:363)
poverty (=1 if BPL) 0:048 0:034 0:026 0:005 0:022  0:017
(0:074) (0:074) (0:076) (0:075) (0:078) (0:077)
GPS distance 0:095 0:104 0:090 0:097 0:117 0:115
(0:074) (0:072) (0:073) (0:071) (0:088) (0:087)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 356 376 354 374 348 368 348 368 348 368
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 13: Linear Dropout Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Cutoff at Age 9
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:041  0:047  0:072  0:075
(0:077) (0:076) (0:070) (0:069)
age2 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:008
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
year 2003  0:551  0:540  0:606  0:589
(0:202) (0:200) (0:177) (0:176)
program membership  0:552  0:552  0:543  0:543  0:601  0:596  0:593  0:589  0:598  0:595
(0:029) (0:027) (0:031) (0:030) (0:029) (0:028) (0:031) (0:031) (0:031) (0:031)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household 0:087 0:070 0:084 0:066 0:097 0:078 0:091 0:072 0:069 0:055
(0:034) (0:033) (0:034) (0:033) (0:033) (0:033) (0:033) (0:033) (0:035) (0:034)
sex (female = 1) 0:164 0:149 0:166 0:150 0:167 0:151
(0:034) (0:033) (0:035) (0:034) (0:035) (0:034)
per member land holding  5:431  4:901  3:929  3:339  6:991  6:424  5:696  5:033  6:736  6:514
(1:558) (1:490) (2:353) (2:120) (1:646) (1:549) (2:344) (2:172) (2:908) (2:570)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk)  3:719  3:483  3:778  3:553  3:037  2:917  3:019  2:891  2:597  2:622
(1:850) (1:836) (1:889) (1:866) (1:880) (1:859) (1:894) (1:866) (1:958) (1:927)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 518 560 511 552 518 560 511 552 511 552
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
Table 14: Linear Enrollment Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Cutoff at Age 9
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:023  0:018 0:006 0:008
(0:094) (0:092) (0:094) (0:092)
age2  0:008  0:008  0:008  0:008
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
year 2003 0:784 0:773 0:836 0:820
(0:264) (0:259) (0:262) (0:257)
program membership 0:566 0:565 0:559 0:560 0:613 0:607 0:608 0:603 0:613 0:610
(0:030) (0:028) (0:032) (0:031) (0:030) (0:029) (0:032) (0:031) (0:032) (0:031)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household  0:085  0:068  0:080  0:063  0:095  0:076  0:087  0:069  0:066  0:052
(0:035) (0:034) (0:035) (0:034) (0:034) (0:033) (0:034) (0:033) (0:035) (0:035)
sex (female = 1)  0:155  0:142  0:157  0:142  0:158  0:143
(0:035) (0:034) (0:035) (0:034) (0:035) (0:034)
per member land holding 5:152 4:631 3:674 3:098 6:631 6:074 5:352 4:704 6:448 6:254
(1:549) (1:486) (2:333) (2:107) (1:637) (1:546) (2:328) (2:160) (2:817) (2:506)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk) 3:863 3:620 3:922 3:698 3:216 3:084 3:202 3:070 2:759 2:786
(1:913) (1:894) (1:943) (1:914) (1:948) (1:922) (1:951) (1:918) (2:005) (1:972)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 518 560 511 552 518 560 511 552 511 552
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 15: Linear Dropout Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Cutoff at Age 11
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age  0:090  0:097  0:161  0:170
(0:171) (0:166) (0:159) (0:154)
age2 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:009
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
year 2003  0:465  0:471  0:470  0:475
(0:494) (0:480) (0:450) (0:435)
program membership  0:659  0:659  0:647  0:647  0:688  0:687  0:675  0:675  0:680  0:681
(0:035) (0:033) (0:038) (0:037) (0:033) (0:032) (0:037) (0:036) (0:036) (0:036)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household 0:117 0:098 0:114 0:094 0:128 0:109 0:120 0:101 0:099 0:091
(0:043) (0:041) (0:043) (0:041) (0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:040) (0:044) (0:042)
sex (female = 1) 0:179 0:179 0:178 0:176 0:179 0:180
(0:040) (0:039) (0:040) (0:040) (0:041) (0:040)
per member land holding  4:287  3:766  2:913  2:298  6:404  5:988  5:055  4:530  5:144  5:379
(1:432) (1:393) (2:089) (1:851) (1:559) (1:492) (2:119) (1:959) (2:649) (2:362)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk)  7:181  7:267  7:257  7:338  6:227  6:338  6:220  6:304  6:398  6:624
(2:028) (2:014) (2:086) (2:062) (2:006) (1:989) (2:063) (2:036) (1:988) (1:971)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 336 359 329 351 336 359 329 351 329 351
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
Table 16: Linear Enrollment Probability Fixed-EffectModel, Cutoff at Age 11
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
age 0:099 0:105 0:167 0:176
(0:170) (0:165) (0:158) (0:153)
age2  0:008  0:008  0:009  0:010
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
year 2003 0:480 0:485 0:484 0:489
(0:491) (0:477) (0:447) (0:432)
program membership 0:669 0:668 0:660 0:660 0:696 0:695 0:687 0:687 0:692 0:693
(0:036) (0:034) (0:039) (0:038) (0:034) (0:033) (0:038) (0:037) (0:037) (0:036)
interaction with 2003
agricultural household  0:112  0:093  0:107  0:088  0:123  0:104  0:113  0:095  0:092  0:084
(0:043) (0:042) (0:043) (0:041) (0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:040) (0:044) (0:042)
sex (female = 1)  0:174  0:174  0:172  0:171  0:174  0:175
(0:040) (0:039) (0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:041)
per member land holding 4:123 3:608 2:732 2:133 6:180 5:770 4:807 4:299 4:932 5:187
(1:424) (1:390) (2:068) (1:837) (1:553) (1:491) (2:102) (1:947) (2:642) (2:357)
nonland asset (1,000,000 Tk) 7:786 7:860 7:905 7:990 6:859 6:956 6:900 6:987 7:055 7:283
(2:069) (2:057) (2:105) (2:082) (2:071) (2:055) (2:103) (2:076) (2:029) (2:015)
extended family members no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
area dummies * 2003 no no no no no no no no thana thana
cohort demeaned no no yes yes no no yes yes yes yes
n 336 359 329 351 336 359 329 351 329 351
Source: Compiled from IFPRI data.
Notes: 1. Location dummies are omitted from the table for brevity.
2. , ,    indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, using cluster robust standard errors.
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